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CHINA’S EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEM: 
STEPS TOWARD ARTICLE 6 LINKAGE 
MELINDA MELVIN* 
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2019, climate action around the world has continued to gain 
momentum. In the United States, Congress has begun discussions of a 
Green New Deal to take radical action on climate change.1 Climate 
activism has become a global phenomenon as citizens around the world 
have organized mass protests to demand governments take actions to 
prepare for climate change. The 2015 Paris Agreement, which created 
binding obligations on all Parties to the Agreement to take climate
action,2 has spurred national governments around the world to think of 
ways to curb greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, respond to threats that
climate change poses to their populations, and ensure sustainable 
progress on those climate policies.3 
An important tool in climate mitigation policy that has emerged is 
carbon pricing. Carbon pricing attempts to internalize the climate
change externality of using fossil fuels to power the economic 
development of the twentieth century. Carbon pricing emerged in 
contrast to command-and-control regulation of GHG emissions, which 
Copyright © 2019 Melinda Melvin.
* Duke University School of Law, J.D./LL.M. expected 2020; Queen’s University, B.Sc.
2017. I would like to thank Kate Konschnik for her guidance and insightful feedback on this piece,
Jonathan Wiener and Jackson Ewing for discussing these topics with me, and the editors of the
Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum for their patience and support.
 1. See H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong. (2019) (“Recognizing the duty of the Federal
Government to create a Green New Deal”). But see Timothy Cama et al., Dems Downplay 
Division over Green New Deal, THE HILL (Feb. 7, 2019), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-
environment/429062-dems-downplay-divisions-over-green-new-deal (outlining divisions within
the Democratic party, as well as partisan opposition to action on climate change).
2. U.N. Conference of the Parties, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, art. 21, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (Jan. 29, 2016) [hereinafter Paris Agreement]. For a discussion on the 
legal character of particular provisions, see Daniel Bodansky, The Legal Character of the Paris
Agreement, 25 REV. EUR. CMTY. & INT’L ENVTL. L. 142, 145–147 (2016). 
3. See Gabriela Iacobuta et al., National Climate Change Mitigation Legislation, Strategy & 
Targets: A Global Update, 18 CLIMATE POL’Y 1114, 1130 (2018) (discussing trends in national
policies following the Paris Agreement and concluding that an increase in targets coincided with
the Paris Agreement).
197 
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198 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXX:197
is a tool often deployed in environmental regulation.4 Command-and-
control regulatory approaches impose fixed limitations on emissions on 
individual geographic regions or polluters.5 Market-based regulatory 
approaches differ from command-and-control regulation of emissions 
by utilizing economic incentives to achieve regulatory goals.6 The 
allure of market-based mechanisms is that greater emissions reductions 
can be achieved at a lower cost, as a market system will identify lowest 
cost abatement options and would ideally even out marginal abatement 
costs for market participants.7 
Though there are critiques of carbon pricing, including moral 
arguments against the commodification of pollution8 and equity 
concerns about emissions trading exacerbating the unequal 
distribution of polluting activity,9 carbon pricing policies continue to 
garner support and broader implementation. Different variations of
carbon pricing have been the primary tool for many countries to 
incentivize emissions reductions and stimulate low-carbon economic 
development.10 One class of carbon pricing is a carbon tax, which seeks 
to reduce carbon emissions by directly placing a price on emissions 
through taxation.11 Another kind of carbon pricing requires emitting
4. See David Driesen, Putting a Price on Carbon: The Metaphor, 44 ENVTL. L. 695, 700–02
(2014) (comparing other environmental protection economic instruments, such as carbon
emissions trading and emissions taxes, with traditional command-and-control regulatory
approaches).
5. Id. at 700–02. For example, the Clean Air Act sets ambient standards for air quality 
through the NAAQS and emissions standards under New Source Performance Standards and
New Source Review, while the SOx acid rain program used economic incentives under the same
Act. See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE PLAIN ENGLISH GUIDE TO THE CLEAN AIR 
ACT, EPA-456/K-07-001(2007), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/
peg.pdf.
 6. See NAT’L CTR. FOR ENVTL. ECON., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-240-R-01-001,
THE UNITED STATES EXPERIENCE WITH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR PROTECTING THE
ENVIRONMENT, at i–iv (2001), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-08/documents/ee-
0216b-13.pdf (discussing market incentives as an alternative to command-and-control policies).
7. Michael Mehling & Endre Tvinnereim, Carbon Pricing and the 1.5 Degree Celsius
Target: Near-Term Decarbonisation and the Importance of an Instrument Mix, 2018 CARBON &
CLIMATE L. REV. 50, 51 (2018). 
8. See, e.g., Simon Caney & Cameron Hepburn, Carbon Trading: Unethical, Unjust and
Ineffective?, 69 ROYAL INST. PHIL. SUPPLEMENT 201, 203 (2011) (quoting the argument that
“turning pollution into a commodity to be bought and sold removes the moral stigma that is
properly associated with it . . . .”).
 9. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Pollution Markets and Social Equity: Analyzing the Fairness
of Cap and Trade, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 29 (2012) (describing concerns of environmental justice
advocates that “emissions allowances might disproportionately end up in the hands of dirtier
plants, which may themselves be disproportionately located in disadvantaged communities”).
 10. WORLD BANK & ECOFYS, STATE AND TRENDS OF CARBON PRICING 2018, at 15 (2018).
 11. Carbon Tax Basics, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS, 
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entities to pay for emissions reductions, leading them to either
purchase allowances for their emissions, reduce emissions to avoid the 
cost of purchasing permits, or reduce emissions to generate surplus 
permits to sell to other emitters.12 An emissions trading system (ETS)
facilitates such trading of units of emissions between sources of
emissions, allowing the price of those emissions to be determined by 
the supply and demand of the market.13 Starting in the 1990s, 
governments began to implement carbon pricing in the form of a
carbon tax.14 In 2005, the first ETS started operation in the European
Union (EU ETS).15 Since then, many more countries have
implemented carbon pricing, either via a carbon tax or a market 
mechanism.16 The proliferation of carbon pricing policies around the 
world has led to a considerable amount of research into how best to
design and operate such systems, to optimize existing systems, and
facilitate future implementation.17 
In the early days of the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC), signatory Parties contemplated a single
international venue for trading emissions reductions.  One attempt at 
realizing this global ETS was the 1997 Kyoto Protocol.18 The Kyoto
Protocol placed obligations on Annex I Parties to reduce GHG 
emissions through national measures and trading emissions reductions 
in tandem with the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint 
Implementation, project-based mechanisms that feed into the carbon
market.19 However, in the years since the ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol, climate negotiations have shifted from trying to achieve a 
https://www.c2es.org/content/carbon-tax-basics (last visited Nov. 15, 2019).
 12. Cap and Trade Basics, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS, 
https://www.c2es.org/content/cap-and-trade-basics (last visited Nov. 15, 2019).
13.  Mehling & Tvinnereim, supra note 7, at 50–51.
14. See WORLD BANK & ECOFYS, supra note 10, at 20 (showing the earliest carbon pricing 
initiatives were carbon taxes implemented in Finland (1990), Poland (1990), Norway (1991),
Sweden (1991) and Denmark (1992)).
 15. Id. 
16. See id. (showing the increase in carbon pricing initiatives over time). As of 2018, there 
are 45 national and 25 subnational carbon pricing initiatives, with more countries indicating in
their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to the UNFCCC that they plan on using
carbon pricing to achieve GHG emissions reductions.  Id. at 18. 
17. See generally, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ ET AL., WORLD BANK, REPORT OF THE HIGH 
LEVEL COMMISSION ON CARBON PRICES (2017) (synthesizing empirical research into carbon
pricing policies and mechanisms to reflect available evidence and literature).
18. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec.
10, 1997, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
19. UNFCCC, Emissions Trading, U.N. CLIMATE CHANGE, https://unfccc.int/process/the-
kyoto-protocol/mechanisms/emissions-trading (last visited Nov. 15, 2019). 
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top-down multilateral climate policy to favor bottom-up approaches 
from a national and even subnational level.20 This shift is reflective of
one of the founding principles of the UNFCCC: “common but
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” of the 
Parties.21 Rather than trying to achieve a single ETS with participants 
from all countries, efforts have shifted to supporting carbon pricing
policies that reflect Parties’ domestic contexts and capacity for 
emissions reductions. As the number and variety of ETSs at 
subnational, national, and regional levels have increased, the Paris 
Agreement explicitly contemplates facilitating cooperative approaches 
between those climate policies in Article 6.22 Some have suggested that 
a central goal of the Paris Agreement was to strike a balance between 
top-down and bottom-up approaches to climate mitigation, and Article
6 attempts to set the framework for governance in this space, which will 
be discussed further in Part I.C.23 
An important development in market-based carbon pricing has 
been the launch of the Chinese national ETS in December 2017, in
accordance with its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution 
(INDC) as part of the Paris Agreement.24 Once fully operational,
China’s new climate policy will be the largest ETS in the world by
volume of carbon traded.25 Since China is the world’s largest GHG 
emitter by country,26 the roll-out of this program has been highly 
20. Compare  INT’L EMISSIONS TRADING ASS’N, GREENHOUSE GAS MARKET REPORT
2008: PIECING TOGETHER A COMPREHENSIVE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT FOR A TRULY
GLOBAL CARBON MARKET (2008) (repeatedly referencing a single global carbon market), with
INT’L EMISSIONS TRADING ASS’N, GREENHOUSE GAS MARKET 2012: NEW MARKETS, NEW 
MECHANISMS, NEW OPPORTUNITIES (2012) (referencing to many disparate and fragmented
developments in carbon pricing).
21. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 3.1, May 9, 1992, S.
TREATY DOC No. 102-38 (1992), 1771 U.N.T.S. 107. 
22.  Paris Agreement, supra note 2, art. 6.
 23. Susan Biniaz, Analyzing Articles 6.2 and 6.4 of the Paris Agreement Along a “Nationally”
and “Internationally” Determined Continuum, in MARKET MECHANISMS AND THE PARIS 
AGREEMENT 55, 55 (Robert N. Stavins & Robert C. Stowe eds., 2017); see infra Part I.C for 
further discussion of Article 6. 
24. See DEP’T OF CLIMATE CHANGE, NAT’L DEV. & REFORM COMM’N OF CHINA,
ENHANCED ACTIONS ON CLIMATE CHANGE: CHINA’S INTENDED NATIONALLY DETERMINED
CONTRIBUTIONS 5, 14 (2015) [hereinafter CHINA’S INDC] (unofficial translation),
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/China/1/China’s%20 
INDC%20-%20on%2030%20June%202015.pdf (including “promoting carbon emission trading 
market” as part of China’s “policies and measures to implement enhanced actions on climate 
change”).
25. Lawrence H. Goulder et al., China’s National Carbon Dioxide Emission Trading System:
An Introduction, 6 ECON. ENERGY & ENVTL. POL’Y 1, 1 (2017).
 26. See China—Country Summary, CLIMATE ACTION TRACKER,
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anticipated and many resources were committed to the planning and
development of the institutional infrastructure for national emissions 
trading prior to the launch. The continued development of this ETS in 
future phases will play a critical role in climate mitigation. Thus,
identifying ways to optimize China’s ETS and potential opportunities 
for cooperation with other countries will ensure success of the program 
and could catalyze even greater ambition. 
One avenue that China can consider in the development of its ETS 
is future linkage opportunities. The literature on carbon pricing
through market measures has shed light on the benefits of linking sub-
global carbon markets.27 These benefits have prompted several 
jurisdictions to link their ETSs with other jurisdictions to take 
advantage of a larger market. For example, the EU ETS as a regional 
scheme has links with Switzerland,28 Norway, Liechtenstein, and 
Iceland,29 while the Western Climate Initiative in the U.S. links 
California’s ETS with Quebec and Ontario30 (though Ontario pulled 
out of the agreement in late 2018).31 
This Note will examine the opportunity for linking China’s ETS to 
other jurisdictions, and Part I will discuss the benefits of linking carbon
markets, some examples of existing linkages and the current legal
https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/china/2019-06-17/sources (Sep. 19, 2019) (depicting
historical, current, and projected emissions data that shows China to be the world’s largest GHG
emitter). 
27. See, e.g., Judson Jaffe et al., Linking Tradable Permit Systems: A Key Element of 
Emerging International Climate Policy Architecture, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 789, 799–800 (2009)
(discussing several benefits of linking).
 28. Swiss Companies Get Green Light to Access EU Carbon Market, SWISSINFO.CH (Mar. 7, 
2019), https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/co2-emissions_swiss-companies-get-green-light-to-access-eu-
carbon-market/44806558. 
29. Emissions Trading: Commission Announces Linkage EU ETS with Norway, Iceland and
Liechtenstein, EUR. COMM’N (Oct. 26, 2007), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-07-
1617_en.htm. 
30. Québec, Ontario and California Join Forces to Fight Climate Change, GOV’T OF
ONTARIO NEWSROOM (Sept. 22, 2017 10:51AM), https://news.ontario.ca/opo/en/2017/9/quebec-
ontario-and-california-join-forces-to-fight-climate-change.html (describing the “agreement to
harmonize and integrate emissions cap programs” entered into by the subnational governments);
see also Agreement on the Harmonization and Integration of Cap-and-Trade Programs for
Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Cal.-Ont.-Que., Sept. 22, 2017 
https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/linkage/2017_linkage_agreement_ca-qc-on.pdf (detailing
the specific terms of the agreement). 
31. Antonella Artuso, Ontario Formally Pulls Plug on Cap and Trade, TORONTO SUN (Oct. 
31, 2018), https://torontosun.com/news/provincial/ontario-formally-pulls-plug-on-cap-and-trade.
This is a particularly interesting link, as these are subnational markets that are linked across 
national borders.
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202 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXX:197
governance for links across borders.32 Part II will take a closer look at
China’s ETS in the broader framework of China’s climate policy and 
its legal institutions, as well as focus on a distinguishing feature of the
ETS: the rate-based Tradable Performance Standard. Part III will offer 
recommendations for China’s ETS, given its political and regulatory 
context, as well as unique challenges posed by its rate-based design.
These findings may also be applicable to other developing countries as 
they consider market-based mitigation policies and intensity-based 
targets. Part IV will examine future opportunities for linking China’s 
market with other carbon markets and potential barriers to linkage,
which China may consider as it develops the national ETS. 
I. LINKING CARBON MARKETS
A. The Argument for Linking 
Two common concerns about carbon markets are that they are 
ineffective at producing emissions reductions and inefficient at 
achieving significant cost savings. An example of the first concern is 
the potential for ‘carbon leakage,’ whereby market forces drive
carbon-intensive industries out of jurisdictions that put a price on 
carbon to jurisdictions where there is no price or a lower price on 
carbon emissions.33 Carbon pricing can impact the competitiveness of
firms or sectors subject to regulation, especially in sectors that have a
higher elasticity of demand or sectors which are more exposed to
trade.34 This has led to some ETSs trying to prevent carbon leakage
through implementing safeguards, such as free allocation of allowances 
as opposed to auctions, which subsidizes the upfront cost of compliance 
to regulated firms to counteract the incentive to move those emissions
elsewhere.35 An example of a free allocation system is when a firm 
receives free allowances for its emissions which fall within a certain 
baseline or benchmark set by the regulator, and must purchase any 
emissions in excess of this benchmark.36 If a firm’s pre-existing 
emissions are not subject to ETS pricing that actually costs the firm 
32. This Note will use the term “carbon markets” as a catch-all to refer to tradable permit
systems seeking to reduce GHG emissions, whether cap-and-trade or emissions-reduction-credit,
rate-based or mass-based systems.
33. Fitsum G. Tiche et al., Carbon Leakage, Free Allocation, and Linking Emissions Trading 
Schemes, 2014 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 97, 98 (2014). 
34. Id.
 35. See id. at 99–101 (comparing the success of using free allocation used to mitigate carbon
leakage in the EU ETS and the Australian Carbon Pricing Mechanism). 
36. Id. at 102. 
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money, it may prevent those emissions from ‘leaking’ to another 
jurisdiction by the firm moving its operations to avoid costs.37 In the
absence of a global ETS, some proponents of linkage have argued that
linking different ETSs could be one pillar of a strategy to minimize
carbon leakage globally by equalizing carbon prices across connected 
jurisdictions.38 
Another important issue related to the overall effectiveness of 
ETSs is ensuring the integrity of emissions reductions through proper 
regulation and governance. Many ETSs allow for the use of offsets for 
firms to comply with their emissions reduction obligations.39 Offsets 
allow flexibility in ETS compliance, as a firm may opt to finance a 
project that results in equivalent emissions reductions instead of 
reducing its actual operational emissions.40 A problem arises if the
accounting associated with the use of carbon credits or offsets is not 
robust, as a firm or the ETS as a whole can claim emissions reductions 
that have not been realized in mitigation efforts.41 This problem can be
exacerbated by linking different systems because of the risk of double 
counting.42 Double counting can arise in a situation where a particular 
jurisdiction in which an emissions reduction takes place claims credit 
for that reduction, then transfers it for some consideration to another 
jurisdiction, which then claims the same reduction again.43 This can 
37. See id. (explaining how free allocation may reduce the incentive to move emissions from
a regulated area to an unregulated area).
 38. Id. at 101–03; Andreas T rk, The Challenge of the European Carbon Market: Emission
Trading, Carbon Leakage and Instruments to Stabilise the CO2 Price: Implications of Linking on
Leakage 9 (WIFO, Working Paper No. 410, 2011) (discussing research into how linking ETSs
could reduce carbon price differentials in those systems which could minimize leakage across
borders). For a hypothetical discussion of regulatory linkages minimizing this kind of leakage
between U.S. states, see Daniel A. Farber, Climate Policy and the United States System of Divided
Powers: Dealing with Carbon Leakage and Regulatory Linkage, 3 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 31
(2014) (discussing efforts by state governments and the executive branch to avoid leakage and
create linkage).
 39. See, e.g., INT’L EMISSIONS TRADING ASS’N, USE OF OFFSET CREDITS ACROSS
EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEMS AND CARBON PRICING MECHANISMS 1–2 (May 2014) (describing 
how different ETSs allow for the use of offsets by regulated entities). 
40. Offsets, CARBON TAX CTR., https://www.carbontax.org/carbon-tax-vs-the-
alternatives/offsets (last visited Nov. 15, 2019).
41.  Lambert Schneider, Anja Kollmuss, & Michael Lazarus, Addressing the Risk of Double
Counting Emissions Reductions Under the UNFCCC 11 (Stockholm Env’t Inst., Working Paper
2014-02, 2014), https://mediamanager.sei.org/documents/Publications/Climate/SEI-WP-2014-02-
Double-counting-risks-UNFCCC.pdf.
 42. WOLFGANG STERK, WUPPERTAL INST. FOR CLIMATE, ENV’T & ENERGY FROM CLEAN
DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM TO SECTORAL CREDITING APPROACHES—WAY FORWARD OR 
WRONG TURN? 17 (2008).
 43. Id. There were concerns about this kind of double counting in the implementation of
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lead to inflated emissions reduction data across ETSs or jurisdictions.44 
The issue of double counting is of such great concern when 
contemplating international cooperation on climate mitigation that 
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement explicitly mentions double counting 
as something to be avoided by Parties when implementing accounting 
standards for transfers of mitigation outcomes.45 Poorly designed 
linkage could exacerbate concerns about the environmental 
effectiveness of carbon pricing. However, well-designed linkages can 
mitigate some of these concerns and ensure that these systems do 
enhance pricing policies to ensure environmental integrity and cost 
savings.
The economic concern about carbon markets is that market 
inefficiencies will prevent the mitigation goal or cost savings from 
being realized. For example, an ETS limited by sector or geographic 
region may be inefficient due to a limited choice of abatement 
strategies. There can also be market power concerns where a regulated
sector may be dominated by a limited number of actors, making a
market for trading between entities illiquid.46 These kinds of market 
inefficiencies defeat the purpose of trading systems designed to reduce 
the aggregate cost of emissions reductions.47 
Linkage of carbon markets has long been proposed as a response 
to these issues raised about the effectiveness of carbon markets.48 Some
of the main advantages of linking systems are greater liquidity, reduced 
price volatility, and increased stability, leading to lower aggregate costs 
of mitigation.49 Some studies have suggested that international 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects that were bought by compliance entities in ETS
such as the EU ETS. The host government may have counted part of the credits produced by the
project in its mitigation and sustainable development strategy, yet the same credits would be used
for compliance under the EU ETS. For further discussion of additionality of CDM offsets, see 
LAMBERT SCHNEIDER, ÖKO-INST., IS THE CDM FULFILLING ITS ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES? AN EVALUATION OF THE CDM AND OPTIONS FOR 
IMPROVEMENT 7–10 (2007) (discussing findings that demonstrate the problematic assessment of
additionality in the past three years and proposing measures of improvement).
44.  Schneider et al., supra note 41, at 4.
 45. Paris Agreement, supra note 2, art. 6.2 (“Parties . . . shall apply robust accounting to 
ensure, inter alia, the avoidance of double counting.”).
46. Christian Flachsland et al., To Link or Not to Link: Benefits and Disadvantages of 
Linking Cap-and-Trade Systems, 9 CLIMATE POL’Y 358, 360 (2009).
 47. See Brittany Harris, Repeating the Failures of Carbon Trading, 23 PAC. RIM L & POL’Y 
J. 755, 766 (2014) (arguing that issues like administrative costs and unreliable monitoring
“undermine the efficiency claims of emissions trading proponents”).
 48. See Jaffe et al., supra note 27, at 800 (“[L]inking can improve market liquidity, reduce
price volatility, and lessen market power concerns.”). 
49. N. Keohane et al., Toward A Club of Carbon Markets, 144 CLIMATIC CHANGE 81, 87– 
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cooperation by linking programs will also result in global cost savings.50 
Linkage is beneficial when there are variable levels of ambition and 
variable marginal abatement costs in the proposed linked 
jurisdictions.51 
In addition to these economic benefits gained through linkage,
there may also be political and administrative benefits to linkage. For 
example, linkage can create a reliance interest for compliance entities,
making termination of links more difficult for governments, thus 
protecting mitigation action from being rolled back by a change in
policy or administration.52 Most political opposition to aggressive
climate mitigation action is due to concerns about the costs associated 
with emissions control policies.53 By bringing down aggregate costs of 
emissions control, countries can be more ambitious in their climate 
mitigation plans if it costs less to their economies to achieve the same
emissions reductions. Additionally, designing a linkage-ready national 
ETS can yield administrative benefits, as policymakers may choose to 
incorporate certain design elements from other established systems 
they hope to link with and can learn from best practices of those
systems.54 
B. Paris Agreement Article 6 
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement is the main legal guidance for 
linking carbon markets across national borders. Since carbon pricing 
88 (2017); Michael A. Mehling, Gilbert E. Metcalf & Robert N. Stavins, Linking Heterogeneous
Climate Policies (Consistent with the Paris Agreement), 48 ENVTL. L. 647, 652 (2018).
 50. See, e.g., Baran Doda et al., Linking Permit Markets Multilaterally 2 (Ctr. for Climate
Change Econ. & Policy, Working Paper No. 311, 2019), www.lse.ac.uk/Grantham 
Institute/publication/a-theory-of-gains-from-trade-in-multilaterally-linked-etss/ (“If these ETSs
can be integrated through linking, substantial cost savings can in principle become available due
to increased efficiency and stability.”); WORLD BANK & ECOFYS, STATE AND TRENDS OF
CARBON PRICING 2016, at 86 (2016) (estimating that international cooperation on ETS could
cause a 54% reduction in global costs of climate mitigation).
51.  Doda et al., supra note 50, at 2.
52. William A. Pizer & Andrew Yates, Terminating Links Between Emissions Trading 
Programs, 71 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 142, 145 (2015). However, there have been instances of
this happening, such as Australia pulling out of a planned link with the EU ETS and Ontario
pulling out of the Western Climate Initiative after elections in those jurisdictions, discussed in
Part I.C.
 53. See, e.g., Cap-And-Trade Is Over, Ontario PCs Say As New Legislation Unveiled, CBC
NEWS (July 25, 2018 3:54PM), https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/ontario-pc-legislation-
kills-cap-and-trade-1.4761398 (explaining that the cap-and-trade system costed Ontario families
$260 per year). 
54. Cf. Mehling et al., supra note 49, at 653 (explaining the “administrative economies of
scale” whereby countries can learn from each other when designing and operating emissions
reduction policies). 
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and emissions trading schemes were gaining traction, there was 
growing consensus in the years leading up to the Paris Agreement that
linkages between carbon pricing policies could enhance global
emissions reduction.55 Article 6 of the Paris Agreement was born out 
of certain Parties’ desire for some degree of UNFCCC oversight of 
transfers of different types of emissions reductions or other mitigation 
outcomes between Parties.56 
Article 6.1 recognizes that Parties choose to cooperate to achieve 
“higher ambition in their mitigation and adaptation actions.”57 Article
6.2 places legal obligations on Parties that choose to use 
“internationally transferred mitigation outcomes” (ITMOs) to count 
towards their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to: (1) 
“promote sustainable development,” (2) “ensure environmental 
integrity and transparency,” and (3) “apply robust accounting . . .
consistent with guidance adopted by the Conference of Parties serving
as the meeting of the Parties to [the Paris] Agreement” (CMA).58 
Article 6.4 establishes a mechanism “to contribute to the mitigation of 
greenhouse gas emissions and support sustainable development” 
overseen by the CMA to fulfil the objectives of Article 6, though a 
detailed description of what the mechanism will do is missing.59 
Importantly, the CMA has yet to issue guidance pursuant to 
Article 6.2 on issues related to ITMOs, as COP negotiations in 
December 2018 in Katowice, Poland failed to bring about consensus 
between the Parties.60 Thus, Parties may be reluctant or otherwise
struggle to move forward with linking ETSs when necessary principles
to guide cooperative approaches have yet to be established. At the
same time, Parties are wary of the CMA being too prescriptive in its 
guidance, as such guidance would be legally binding on the Parties and
may reduce the flexibility for Parties which is the goal of the Paris 
Agreement.61 Given this, a review of currently linked programs might 
suggest pathways forward for countries that may want to consider 
55. See, e.g., DANIEL BODANSKY ET AL., HARV. PROJECT ON CLIMATE AGREEMENTS,
FACILITATING LINKAGE OF HETEROGENEOUS REGIONAL, NATIONAL, AND SUB-NATIONAL
CLIMATE POLICIES THROUGH A FUTURE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT 2 (2014). 
56. BENITO MULLER ET AL., EUROPEAN CAPACITY BLDG. INITIATIVE, ARTICLE 6:
MARKET APPROACHES UNDER THE PARIS AGREEMENT 5 (2018),
https://ecbi.org/sites/default/files/Article%20_0.pdf.
57.  Paris Agreement, supra note 2, art. 6.1.
 58. Id. art. 6.2. 
59. Id. art. 6.4. 
60.  Mehling et al., supra note 49, at 651.
 61. Id. at 687. 
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linkage in the future.
C. Types of Existing Linkage 
There are three methods for linking ETSs. First, countries can
purchase or otherwise transfer a mitigation outcome from another 
jurisdiction to fulfill their NDCs as described under Article 6.2.62 
Secondly, two jurisdictions can enter into a unilateral or bilateral
agreements recognizing emissions reductions in the other jurisdiction 
for compliance with domestic mitigation requirements.63 Thirdly, 
regulated entities in different jurisdictions can directly exchange 
emissions reductions credits across borders through a shared inventory 
between those jurisdictions.64 
There have been fewer unilateral linkages—where one ETS 
accepts credits from another ETS without reciprocity—than other 
types of linkage, but there are a few notable examples. One of the 
largest unilateral links is the CDM under the Kyoto Protocol and the 
Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) created through the
program.65 Some ETSs allow participants to use CERs for their 
compliance obligations, such as the EU ETS.66 CERs have also been 
used by countries to fulfil their obligations under the Kyoto Protocol,
an example of the first kind of linkage.67 Australia announced a link 
between its proposed cap-and-trade system and the EU ETS, with the 
former accepting credits purchased from the latter but not vice versa;68 
however, this ended when Australia rescinded its carbon tax and cap-
and-trade system.69 The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI)
in the Northeastern U.S.—a linked market between states— 
considered amending its Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to
allow participants to use foreign-sourced allowances if allowance prices 
62. Id. at 651. 
63. Id. 
64. Id.
 65. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 18, art. 12 (setting out the Clean Development
Mechanism which allows CERs to be used for to contribute to compliance by Annex I countries
with their emissions reduction commitments). 
66. STERK, supra note 42, at 3. 
67. Id. 
68. Australia and European Commission Agree on Pathway Towards Fully Linking 
Emissions Trading Systems, EUR. COMM’N (Aug. 28, 2012), https://ec.europa.eu/clima/ 
news/articles/news_2012082801_en.
 69. ENVTL. DEFENSE FUND, AUSTRALIA: AN EMISSIONS TRADING CASE STUDY 2 (May
2015), https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/australia-case-study-may2015.pdf. (noting that the
repeal of the Clean Energy Act cancelled plans of a proposed link of the Australian ETS to the 
EU system). 
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exceeded a trigger, but the provision was never exercised since the
clearing price never exceeded the trigger.70 
There are more examples of bilateral linkages, where two ETSs 
decide to link their systems so that allowances can be traded across 
systems. A notable example of bilateral linkage is the Western Climate 
Initiative between California and Québec, which have ETSs with 
harmonized features and jointly administer some aspects of the 
systems. The link became multilateral when Ontario joined the WCI,
but after a change of government, the province pulled out of the link. 
The links between Norway’s ETS and Switzerland’s ETS with the EU 
ETS seem similar to bilateral linkage but are an example of the third 
kind of linkage. They operate separate domestic caps and cover 
different sectors, but covered entities under the Norwegian and Swiss 
systems utilize the EU ETS inventory and trade in the same market as 
EU participants.71 
These examples show the potential for different kinds of linkage,
but this does not mean linking is always attractive. Linkage between
ETSs can be very difficult when the systems have fundamentally 
different design features.72 Early attitudes towards linking were not as 
concerned with differences in design of ETSs because of the
excitement over the economic benefits of linkage.73 This may have 
been due to less diversity among systems in early carbon pricing
experiments. However, in an environment where national and 
subnational ETSs differ in their targets, accounting provisions and
scope, linkage between heterogeneous systems can prove to be quite
difficult on a technical level.74 Furthermore, despite the economic 
benefits derived from linkage, there can be political barriers to linkage.
For example, a less ambitious jurisdiction in a linked system may end 
up being a net buyer of permits. The subsequent result is a continuous 
flow of cash to the selling jurisdiction for those purchased permits,
effectively subsidizing the emissions reductions and co-benefits in the
70. Erik Haites & Michael Mehling, Linking Existing and Proposed GHG ETS in North 
America, 9 CLIMATE POL’Y 373, 377 (2009).
 71. See  SONJA HAWKINS & INGRID JEGOU, INT’L CTR. TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV.,
LINKING EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEMES: CONSIDERATIONS FOR A JOINT EU-KOREAN CARBON 
MARKET, ISSUE PAPER NO. 3, at 29–35 (2014) (describing the Norwegian and Swiss schemes).
 72. See Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, Linking Policies When Tastes Differ: Global
Climate Policy in a Heterogeneous World, 6 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y, Winter 2012, at 110,
127 (concluding that linking “heterogeneous systems” would be difficult).
 73. Dmitry Fedosov, Linking Carbon Markets: Development and Implications, 10 CARBON 
& CLIMATE L. REV. 202, 204 (2016). 
74.  Mehling et al., supra note 49, at 658–59. 
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selling jurisdiction, which may not be politically palatable in the selling 
jurisdiction.75 The subsequent sections will focus on the Chinese ETS,
ways to prime the national ETS for linkage, taking into account such 
barriers as the rate-based target, and examine potential opportunities
for links. 
II. THE CHINESE NATIONAL ETS 
The national ETS in China set ambitious goals for carbon trading, 
covering many polluting sectors and aiming to catalyze widespread 
efficiency improvements across the country.76 The volume of carbon 
that will be covered at full implementation dwarfs any other ETS, so
the Chinese system holds a lot of potential for linking carbon markets 
in the region and beyond. China’s INDC commits it to peaking GHG 
emissions by 2030 and lowering CO2 emissions per unit of GDP by 60– 
65% relative to 2005 levels.77 It also plans to increase non-fossil fuels in 
energy consumption to 20%. Emissions trading and further investment 
into renewable energy sources will be key in achieving the goals of the 
INDC.78 As early as 2006, Chinese policymakers began to consider a
shift from traditional command-and-control environmental regulation
to market-based regulation at the sixth National Environmental 
Protection Conference.79 In 2007, the National Development and
Reform Commission (NDRC) included market mechanisms as a path 
forward for GHG mitigation strategy in China to incentivize emissions 
reductions within industry.80 Before a national ETS was on the table,
China participated in global market mechanisms as a source of CDM 
offset projects for ETS compliance markets.81 Over time, expanding 
GHG mitigation beyond the offsets industry became a national priority
and in 2010, China’s Twelfth Five-Year Plan included the launch of a
nationwide ETS.82 This led to the creation of seven regional pilot 
75. Fedosov, supra note 73, at 211.
76. William A. Pizer & Xiliang Zhang, China’s New National Carbon Market, 108 AM.
ECON. ASS’N PAPERS & PROC. 463, 463 (2018).
 77. CHINA’S INDC, supra note 24, at 5.
 78. See Jie Wu et al., How Can China Achieve Its Nationally Determined Contribution
Targets Combining Emissions Trading Scheme and Renewable Energy Policies?, 10 ENERGIES,
Aug. 2017, at 1, 1 (“Addressing climate change and promoting low-carbon development are the
two key goals of energy policy in China.”).
 79. JACKSON EWING & MINYOUNG SHIN, NORTHEAST ASIA AND THE NEXT GENERATION
OF CARBON MARKET COOPERATION 19 (June 2017). 
80. NAT’L DEV. & REFORM COMM’N, CHINA’S NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE PROGRAM
31 (June 2007).
 81. Id. at 33. 
82. GOVERNMENT OF CHINA, TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN 2011–2015 (2011) (unofficial
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programs to experiment with different designs and to build up 
knowledge and expertise of administering ETSs domestically.83 In
2014, the government announced a plan to develop a nationwide ETS 
and had plans to link the existing pilot programs to the new ETS once
it began.84 The NDRC oversaw the implementation of these pilot 
programs and the early stages of preparing for the national ETS, but 
that authority has now been transferred to the newly-created Ministry 
of Ecology and Environment (MEE).85 
In November of 2011, the Chinese government launched ETS 
pilot programs in seven regions: Shenzhen, Beijing, Shanghai, 
Guangdong, Tianjin, Hubei, and Chongqing.86 These pilot programs,
which were operational by 2014, cover 1.2 billion tons of carbon 
dioxide per year, or 11.4 percent of national emissions in 2014. These
ETSs are not identical in their design but share certain characteristics. 
For example, each ETS has the same kinds of allowances distinguishing
between existing and new entrants to the market, has price stability 
mechanisms to address supply-demand inefficiencies, and allows 
Chinese Certified Emissions Reduction (CCER) offsets.87 One
important similarity is that the allowances traded in all the ETSs are 
Tradable Performance Standards (TPS), which are intensity standards 
rather than absolute standards.88 This is also the design for the national
ETS and poses certain challenges for the operation of the markets and 
the potential for future linkages of China’s ETS to other carbon 
markets. 
A. Defining the ETS Target: Mass-based vs. Rate-based 
Emissions trading systems can set different kinds of targets, such
as mass-based or rate-based targets. A mass-based ETS, or cap-and-
trade system, sets a cap on total emissions for the sector or region it
covers, and either allocates allowances within that cap to regulated 
translation), https://cbi.typepad.com/china_direct/2011/05/chinas-twelfth-five-new-plan-the-full-
english-version.html.
83.  Goulder et al., supra note 25, at 3.
 84. Xi Liang, Developing a Linkage-Ready Carbon Market: A View from China, in ASIA
SOC’Y POL’Y INST., CARBON MARKET COOPERATION IN NORTHEAST ASIA 82, 83 (Jackson 
Ewing ed., 2018). 
85. China ETS under New Ministry of Ecology and Environment, INT’L CARBON ACTION
P’SHIP (Mar. 19, 2018), https://icapcarbonaction.com/en/news-archive/532-china-ets-under-new-
ministry-of-ecological-environment.
 86. Liang, supra note 84, at 83.
 87. EWING & SHIN, supra note 79 , at 20–21. 
88. Id. at 21. 
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entities or requires them to purchase allowances for emissions in a 
certain compliance period.89 This is commonly viewed as yielding more
aggressive action on climate change compared to other pricing policies 
as it places a hard cap on the amount of emissions a certain sector or 
geographic area will emit during a period. For example, the mitigation 
outcome of implementing a carbon tax is uncertain. Depending on the 
rate, a tax may incentivize actual emissions reductions or may just add
an additional cost to business-as-usual without catalyzing low-carbon
innovation or actual emissions reductions.90 In a mass-based ETS, the 
hard cap and increasing stringency over time means the total emissions 
reductions the system will achieve can be calculated.91 Some examples
of mass-based ETSs are the EU ETS and RGGI.
An intensity-, or rate-based, ETS allocates allowances based on 
emissions reductions per unit of output or on energy efficiency.
Emissions reductions can take place either by switching from a fossil 
fuel energy source like coal or oil to a cleaner source like solar or wind 
energy, or by increasing energy efficiency of the process that requires 
energy.92 Energy efficiency plays an important role in reducing carbon
emissions and has been a key element of many climate action plans.93 
To incentivize greater emissions reductions through energy efficiency, 
some ETSs have focused on trading efficiency standards. This 
approach is particularly attractive in developing countries that are 
concerned that strict emissions controls will overburden economic 
development.94 In a mass-based ETS, firms’ compliance costs include 
both the cost of abatement through investment in efficiency 
technologies and the cost of purchasing or surrendering allowances for 
actual emissions.95 In a rate-based ETS, the firm receives rebates on 
89. A. Denny Ellerman & Ian Sue Wing, Absolute vs. Intensity-Based Emissions Caps 2–3
(MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change Rep. 100, 2003). 
90. Jane Andrew et al., Carbon Tax: Challenging Neoliberal Solutions to Climate Change, 
21 CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING 611, 616 (2010).
 91. See Ellerman & Wing, supra note 89, at 8–9 (explaining how a series of absolute caps
allows a government to know and plan its emissions reduction trajectory).
 92. See Keith Regan, The Rise of the Energy Efficiency Trading Scheme, in IETA
GREENHOUSE GAS MARKET 2012: NEW MARKETS, NEW MECHANISMS, NEW OPPORTUNITIES
104, 104–05 (Anthony Mansell ed., 2012) (explaining how energy efficiency is an important
mechanism to reduce emissions).
93. Noah M. Sachs, Should the United States Create Trading Markets for Energy Efficiency?
46 ENVTL. L. REP. 10466, 10466 (2016).
 94. See, e.g., Regan, supra note 92, at 104 (describing India’s “Performance, Achieve and 
Trade” (PAT) energy efficiency program for the industrial sector).
95. Jan-Tjeerd Boom & Bouwe R. Dijkstra, Permit Trading and Credit Trading: A 
Comparison of Cap-Based and Rate-Based Emissions Trading Under Perfect and Imperfect
Competition, 44 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 107, 107–08 (2009). 
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costs associated with abatement strategies based on the established 
benchmark ratio.96 This kind of design is attractive because it 
accommodates continued economic growth and the lower net cost of 
compliance has a lower impact on final product prices.97 
A prominent example of a successful rate-based market
mechanism was the U.S. lead phasedown in gasoline through the 1980s.
This program pre-dated the sulfur dioxide tradable permit system set 
up to address acid rain and interstate pollution in the 1990 Clean Air 
Act Amendments, so it was the first large-scale use of tradable permits 
in environmental policy.98 Due to rising concerns about the human
health effects of lead in the atmosphere due to leaded gasoline, the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) decided to implement 
regulations to stop the addition of lead to gasoline.99 The program set 
standards for lead additive concentration in gasoline for individual
refineries based on their overall gasoline output.100 Because some
larger refineries were already capable of producing unleaded gasoline 
and smaller refineries producing leaded gasoline would struggle to 
meet the new stringent lead standards, EPA used a market mechanism
to allow for inter-refinery trading.101 Furthermore, because the
standard was a performance-based one, the refineries could continue
to add the same amount of lead to their gasoline or even increase it, if
they concurrently increased the amount of unleaded gasoline they 
produced in the compliance period.102 By allowing the refineries to
trade with one another and bank allowances for the future, the industry 
as a whole was able to comply with an outright ban on lead additives in 
gasoline by 1996.103 The U.S. lead phasedown is seen as an effective 
environmental policy that produced results with low overall costs.104 
96.  Pizer & Zhang, supra note 76, at 465. 
97. Id.
98. Richard G. Newell & Kristian Rogers, The Market-Based Lead Phasedown, in MOVING
TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LESSONS FROM TWENTY YEARS OF
EXPERIENCE 171, 171 (Jody Freeman & Charles D. Kolstad eds., 2006). 
99. Id. at 175. 
100. See id. at 178–79 (explaining the mechanics of lead allowances, trading, and banking
under the lead phasedown program). 
101. Richard Newell & Kristian Rogers, Res. for the Future, The U.S. Experience with the
Phasedown of Lead in Gasoline 6–7 (June 2003) (discussion paper). 
102. Id. at 4.
 103. See id. at 26 (showing lead additives in gasoline were prohibited in 1996).
 104. See Richard D. Morgenstern, China’s National CO2 Emissions Trading Program: A New
Application of Tradable Performance Standards, in HARV. PROJECT ON CLIMATE AGREEMENTS,
MARKET MECHANISMS AND THE PARIS AGREEMENT 87, 88 (Robert N. Stavins & Robert C.
Stowe eds., 2017) (“The lead phasedown is widely seen as an effective and efficient means of 
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Intensity-based targets are attractive because of their flexibility to 
adapt to economic conditions, as the number of allowances is 
dependent on output.105 However, this same feature is criticized as 
some argue that it subsidizes total emissions compared to command-
and-control or cap-and-trade approaches.106 Furthermore, the
flexibility afforded by these systems requires more data to maintain the 
integrity of the system, as information on both emissions and output 
are required. For example, a study of the U.S. lead phasedown revealed
that there were more unintentional and intentional violations of the
program by net buyers of permits who took advantage of the EPA 
having incomplete information on emissions and output.107 
B. China’s Rate-Based Strategy 
Because of these advantages of a rate-based strategy, Chinese 
policymakers chose a rate-based design for its national ETS.  The 
emissions units used are Tradable Performance Standards (TPS), 
representing firms’ emissions intensity based on their output.108 This 
means that permits are issued based on historical emissions levels 
relative to an individual firm’s output. The MEE collects data on
emissions for each sector and sets a benchmark emissions-output ratio, 
such as x tons of carbon dioxide per kWh for the power sector.109 Based
on this ratio and historical data for each firm’s recorded emissions and
output, the provincial government allocates allowances to firms.110 At 
the beginning of the compliance period, a firm receives emissions 
allowances based on projected output and the benchmark emissions-
output ratio.111 At the end of the compliance period, the firm’s 
allowances will be adjusted based on actual output. If a firm’s actual
rate of emissions to output exceeded the benchmark ratio, it must 
purchase allowances for those additional emissions during the 
compliance period.112 If a firm’s emissions rate was lower than the 
reducing the lead content of gasoline.”).
105. Lawrence H. Goulder & Richard D. Morgenstern, China’s Rate-Based Approach to
Reducing CO2 Emissions: Strengths, Limitations, and Alternatives, 108 AEA PAPERS AND 
PROCEEDINGS 458, 459 (2018). 
106. Morgenstern, supra note 104, at 88. 
107.  Newell & Rogers, supra note 98, at 189.
 108. See Pizer & Zhang, supra note 76, at 464 (explaining how the output-based allocation
system used in China’s ETS is a tradable performance standard, or rate-based standard). 
109.  Goulder & Morgenstern, supra note 105, at 3–4. 
110. See Pizer & Zhang, supra note 76, at 465 (describing the formula used in allowance
allocation based on the benchmark ratio and firm output).
 111. Id. 
112. Morgenstern, supra note 104, at 89.
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benchmark ratio, then it receives surplus allowances which it can
choose to either bank for future compliance periods, or sell them to 
other compliance entities.113 
There are several reasons why Chinese policymakers chose this 
route for the ETS. Firstly, TPS reconciles China’s appetite for
continued economic growth with emissions mitigation. The number of 
total allowances available with TPS is not limited in a rate-based 
system, as increasing output increases the number of allowances 
available, potentially decreasing the aggregate costs of compliance.114 
By allowing the total amount of emissions to vary based on economic 
output, the rate-based approach is not as burdensome on the Chinese
end-consumers as a cap-and-trade approach might be.115 Secondly, the 
central government controls the price of electricity.116 Thus, if a power 
generator is required to purchase extra allowances for 
underperforming during the compliance period, it cannot increase the 
price at which it sells electricity, so the cost of compliance will fall to
the generator.117 By adjusting the allowances a compliance entity
receives based on its output during the compliance period, the rate-
based target eases the individual burden of the regulation. This is 
especially important for certain sectors and regions whose economic 
potential the central government wants to protect.118 
However, as the next section will discuss, this distinctive feature 
of China’s ETS poses certain challenges for the policy’s success, 
warranting extra care in developing the legal and regulatory
infrastructure that will govern the system. This will be important for 
the environmental integrity of the ETS which in turn is critical for 
future linkages to other carbon markets. The next two sections will 
consider steps China can take towards linkage-readiness. 
III. LEGAL INSTITUTIONS AND REGULATORY INFRASTRUCTURE
Any regulatory policy’s effectiveness and success is predicated
upon the ability of the governing entity to enforce that policy among 
regulated actors. Emissions trading in China is no different, and the 
113. Id. 
114. See Goulder & Morgenstern, supra note 105, at 459 (explaining how the flexibility of a 
TPS system can prevent high allowance prices).
 115. Id.
116.  Pizer & Zhang, supra note 76, at 464. 
117. Alex Y. Lo, Challenges to the Development of Carbon Markets in China, 16 CLIMATE
POL’Y 109, 119 (2016). 
118. Id.
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success of the national ETS in achieving emissions reductions will 
depend on its ability to create and regulate the market for TPS among 
entities covered by the program. Coordinated, effective enforcement 
by the governmental entities that will administer the program and the 
accuracy of data submitted by firms to effectuate compliance will be 
critical to the program actually incentivizing emissions reductions by 
those entities. 
A. Decentralized Enforcement by Local Governments 
The administration and enforcement of China’s ETS is 
decentralized among different levels of government. The MEE, an 
agency of the central government, is responsible for determining
benchmark ratios and allocation methodologies, but the actual 
allocation and enforcement of the program will be administrated by
provincial governments.119 The NDRC began, and the MEE continues, 
a considerable effort to develop regulatory infrastructure to determine 
the scope of coverage, design the monitoring, reporting and 
verification (MRV) system at a national level, coordinate the 
provincial government’s collection of data from thousands of entities,
and quantify benchmark ratios for allowance allocation.120 These
institutions are necessary to the efficient functioning of the ETS in its 
limited operation for the power sector and in future expansion to other 
sectors.121 
This decentralized enforcement structure may pose a challenge for 
the effectiveness of the ETS. The integrity of a rate-based ETS relies 
on accurate, complete data on both the emissions of a facility as well as 
whatever its output is.122 The quality of data is not only important for 
ensuring compliance for entities, but it is also important ex-ante when 
setting performance standards for the sector.123 Here, the provincial 
governments will be responsible for collecting data from the firms in
their jurisdictions, but it is the central MEE that will set the benchmark
ratio for all sectors.124 The dialogue between the MEE and local 
governments will be complicated, as local governments will need to 
119. Morgenstern, supra note 104, at 90. 
120. EWING & SHIN, supra note 79, at 23. 
121. See Valerie Karplus, Institutions and Emissions Trading in China, 108 AM. ECON. ASS’N
PAPERS & PROC. 468, 468 (2018) (giving examples where institutions influence the operation and
success of ETSs, such as preexisting economic regulation or transaction costs).
 122. Id. at 471. 
123.  Goulder et al., supra note 25, at 10. 
124. Id. 
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provide accurate prior emissions data to the MEE to set benchmark
ratios for each compliance period, administer the allowances during 
the compliance period, and report back to the central MEE after 
output for that period has been quantified. Thus, the central 
government will need to be able to rely on timely, accurate data from 
provincial governments for standard setting.
The structure of the political system in China and incentives for 
different actors within it may present challenges for effective
enforcement of ETS compliance. The party cadre system which 
organizes local government officials in the centralized political system
creates interesting political incentives for those leaders.125 In China, the
central government appoints local leaders to their provincial posts for 
short terms and transfers them from province to province, in part to 
prevent constituents’ allegiance to local personalities rather than the
central government.126 These local party officials seek promotion to a 
higher position within the Party-state to the central government, and 
are primarily assessed by economic performance of the jurisdiction 
under their control.127 This lack of accountability to the local 
community has caused the political agenda at the local level to typically 
focus on short-term economic policies at the expense of other policies 
which may take longer to execute, like public health or 
infrastructure.128 
One example of this is environmental law, particularly laws aimed 
at improving air quality, which is a serious issue in almost all major 
Chinese cities.129 The Chinese government has responded to public 
outcry over extreme air pollution from industry by requiring local 
governments to increase energy efficiency, encourage fuel-switching,
and install pollution control equipment such as SO2 and NOx scrubbers 
at polluting facilities.130 However, despite this mandate from the central 
government, there has been evidence of widespread manipulation of 
125. See generally Cai (Vera) Zuo, Promoting City Leaders: The Structure of Political
Incentives in China, 224 CHINA Q. 955 (2015) for an interesting study into political incentives in
Chinese local governments providing a theory for why local leaders respond to their
constituencies’ concerns, despite not being democratically elected.
126. Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & Shitong Qiao, Binding Leviathan: Credible Commitment in an 
Authoritarian Regime, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1591, 1596–97 (2018). 
127. Alex Wang, The Search for Sustainable Legitimacy: Environmental Law and
Bureaucracy in China, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365, 379–80 (2013). 
128.  Hills & Qiao, supra note 126, at 1601–02.
 129. See Wang, supra note 127, at 386–87 (introducing the connection between poor 
environmental protection and local government incentives in the Chinese central government).
 130. VALERIE J. KARPLUS, DOUBLE IMPACT: WHY CHINA NEEDS COORDINATED AIR 
QUALITY AND CLIMATE STRATEGIES 4 (2015). 
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air pollution data by local governments and slack enforcement of 
polluters’ noncompliance.131 The political incentives for local leaders in
the party cadre system offer an explanation for the lack of credible
commitment by local government to tackle environmental issues. In 
some cities with particularly acute air quality problems, the central 
government has begun evaluating local leaders’ performance not solely 
based on economic performance but on improvements in air quality.132 
Unfortunately, the exaggeration of environmental outcomes has been
worse under this model, as local officials seek to improve their
perceived performance in evaluations by the central government.133 
Chinese local governments’ negligent enforcement of 
environmental laws bears a warning for localized enforcement of ETS 
compliance. The integrity of local institutions executing the program 
will be critical to the success of the national ETS. In order to ensure 
incentives are properly aligned for the effectiveness of the ETS, the
MEE can impose checks on local leaders charged with administrating 
the program, similar to the discipline of local leaders for poor air 
quality outcomes. The State Council could include ETS development 
and enforcement as a metric of success for those leaders’ promotion. 
The MEE could require local leaders to regularly report on the
effectiveness of the program, as indicated by volume of trading or 
surplus allowances generated by firms in that region. It could also
require local government to commit to training and capacity building 
for covered entities to ensure they understand their data and
accounting obligations under the new ETS.
This issue will be even more important where local leaders may 
also have conflicts of interest with their involvement with state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). Power generation throughout China is dominated
by SOEs, and many of the largest state-owned power generation
companies in the world are located in China.134 Chinese SOEs are
131. See Dalia Ghanem & Junjie Zhang, ‘Effortless Perfection:’ Do Chinese Cities Manipulate
Air Pollution Data?, 68 J. ENVTL. ECON. MGMT. 203, 203 (2014) (“Some cities are allegedly
under-reporting their air pollution levels.”); see also Alice Yan, Thousands of Polluters in
Northern China Fake Emissions Data, Resist Checks, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Mar. 31, 2017, 
2:29 PM), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2083780/thousands-
polluters-northern-china-fake-emissions-data (“Thousands of polluters have faked emissions
data and resisted checks from environmental inspectors . . . .”).
132. Valerie J. Karplus & Xiliang Zhang, Incentivizing Firm Compliance with China’s 
National Emissions Trading System, 6 ECON. ENERGY & ENVTL. POL’Y 73, 77 (2017).
 133. See Ghanem & Zhang, supra note 131, at 206 (discussing how the incentive structure for
improved environmental conditions encourages local officials to alter their reports).
 134. See Andrew Prag et al., State-Owned Enterprises and the Low-Carbon Transition 15 tbl.1
(Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Working Paper No. 129, 2018) (listing the fifty largest
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interesting as they are not purely profit-maximizing entities, rather,
they often are utilized to implement public policies on behalf of the 
Chinese government.135 Though this could mean that the SOEs will be
able to cooperate with the local government on compliance with the 
ETS, there may also be incentives to be more lenient in enforcement 
for SOEs whose performance is important for local government 
revenues, and SOEs often enjoy certain advantages due to preferential 
treatment by regulators.136 In addition, these conflicts of interest could
pose problems for linkages with other countries whose economies are 
less dominated by state ownership. 
B. Accounting Principles 
The gradual reduction of the ETS scope from eight heavy industry
sectors to four sectors to just the electric power generation sector for 
the soft launch was disappointing to some actors anticipating the 
national launch.137 However, despite the initial phases covering a much
smaller total number of emissions, this decision may be more beneficial 
for the ETS in the long run. The power generation sector has relatively 
complete emissions data, so the data required to implement the other 
aspects of the program were already in place.138 This decision signals a
desire to lay a solid foundation for the ETS that will be of historic
proportions once it expands to other sectors.
Any ETS relies on the quality of data that is submitted for 
compliance to be effective. However, the TPS feature of China’s ETS 
introduces some complexity to the process, because both emissions
data and data on the output of each regulated entity is required to
determine the final allowance allocation before any trading can begin. 
Requiring firms to submit output data could be problematic as this may
be commercially sensitive information that firms may be unwilling to
fully disclose. 
electricity generating companies in the world, eleven of which are Chinese and 100% state-
owned).
 135. See id. at 21 (“SOEs often differ from privately held companies by being mandated to
pursue public policy objectives determined by the government, broadening the goals of the
company beyond profit maximisation.” (internal citation omitted)).
 136. See id. at 25 (describing some advantages enjoyed by incumbent SOE electricity
companies). 
137. See Zhongjue Yu et al., A General Equilibrium Analysis on the Impacts of Regional and 
Sectoral Emission Allowance Allocation at Carbon Trading Market, 192 J. CLEANER
PRODUCTION 421, 430 (2018) (describing how the Chinese government reduced the scope due to
poor historical emissions data in other sectors). 
138. Id.
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China must develop institutional strategies to ensure that 
submitted data are high quality. It can do this by investing into capacity 
building and training for firms, as well as organizational understanding 
of the data requirements that ETS compliance will warrant.139 It should
also establish accounting principles that ensure the integrity of data 
submitted by compliance entities. It has already done so by requiring
third-party verification of emissions data.140 This third-party process 
could be strengthened further if the MEE funds the verifiers rather 
than the compliance entities, as was demonstrated by the Beijing 
ETS.141 
Robust accounting in the domestic ETS is also of critical 
importance to future linkage as any cross-border transfers of 
allowances between China’s ETS and other ETSs will be governed by
Article 6.2 and guidance issued by the CMA. The Paris Agreement’s 
language of “Parties . . . shall apply robust accounting to ensure, inter 
alia, the avoidance of double counting” is currently the extent of legally 
binding principles on this matter. However, by strengthening
accounting principles in the early phases of the program, the Chinese 
ETS will not only benefit at a domestic level to ensure the integrity of
the system, but will also be linkage-ready for future cooperation with 
other jurisdictions. 
IV. LINKAGE OPPORTUNITIES AND LINKAGE READINESS
Following from the general consensus that linking carbon markets 
can enhance beneficial trades between different systems, linkage 
between China’s national ETS and other markets may yield benefits 
for cooperation on climate mitigation. As ETSs are developed and
implemented throughout Asia, discussions around linkage between 
those jurisdictions have increased. Within China, the discussion of 
linking began at a domestic level as the existing pilot programs had to
be incorporated into the new national ETS.142 However, there have 
also been proposals of a linked market in Northeast Asia with national 
and subnational ETSs in Japan and Korea.143 
139.  Karplus & Zhang, supra note 132, at 83.
 140. Id. In the Beijing pilot ETS, the city government committed resources to fund the third-
party verifiers of emissions data for the MRV system, rather than requiring the compliance
entities to pay for it themselves, avoiding potential conflicts of interest. Id.
 141. Id. 
142. Yu Liu et al., Carbon Emission Trading System of China: A Linked Market vs. Separated
Markets, 7 FRONTIERS EARTH SCI. 465, 465 (2013). 
143. See, e.g., EWING & SHIN, supra note 79, at 12–13 (laying out a potential pathway to
linkages between Northeast Asian carbon markets).
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A. Potential Linkages for China’s ETS 
Linking China’s ETS to other carbon markets could bring about 
mutual benefits for the linked partners, such as price convergence and
greater liquidity. Models of hypothetical linkage have shown that 
China will likely be a net exporter of permits in a linked market with
developed countries, due to a lower marginal abatement cost.144 Thus,
linkage becomes a potential source of revenue for China, but more
importantly, will contribute to a more efficient market. 
The two markets that come to mind immediately as potential
partners for China are the Republic of Korea and Japan. Korea began 
an economy-wide national ETS in 2015, marking the first national 
carbon market in Asia. However, reviews on its performance have 
been mixed, as the market struggles with price volatility, low liquidity 
and regulatory uncertainty.145 As the Korean system enters later phases 
of development, linkage with other ETSs could be an attractive option
to increase liquidity in its market and to access markets with a lower 
marginal abatement cost.146 China could potentially be a beneficial 
ETS linkage partner for Korea if they decide to pursue linkage. One
concern may be that Korea’s ETS is economy-wide, while China’s will 
be limited to certain sectors. To ensure this kind of link results in actual
emissions reductions in each sector domestically, trades between
Chinese and Korean regulated entities could be limited to same-sector 
trades rather than allowing dirtier facilities in Korea to just purchase
credits from sectors with lower abatement costs in China. 
Although Japan does not have a national ETS, subnational 
emissions trading in Tokyo and Saitama Prefecture as well as a
voluntary emissions credit program for businesses has been
operational for a long time in the region.147 Japan has a high marginal 
abatement cost compared to other developed economies.148 As a result,
in order to meet its ambitious mitigation goals in its INDC, Japan will 
need to seek out more cost-effective climate policies.149 One particular
struggle for Japan is its energy mix after the nuclear accident in
144. See Shiro Takeda et al., Labor Market Distortions and Welfare-Decreasing International
Emissions Trading 20 tbl.3 (Waseda Inst. of Political Econ., Working Paper No. E1422, 2015)
(modelling analyses showing how, under different scenarios of international emissions trading,
China will be a net exporter of permits).
 145. EWING & SHIN, supra note 79, at 11. 
146.  Hawkins & Jegou, supra note 71, at 23.
 147. Toshi H. Arimura, The Potential of Carbon Market Linkage Between Japan and China, 
in CARBON MARKET COOPERATION IN NORTHEAST ASIA, supra note 84, at 103.
 148. Id.
 149. Id. 
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Fukushima in 2011.150 Nuclear was an important source of energy in the 
country before the accident, but Japan has had to lean on fossil fuel 
imports in the wake of Fukushima, hampering its progress towards a
clean energy grid.151 A unilateral link between the existing schemes in
Japan could improve the efficiency of the market and could catalyze 
greater ambition in Japan.152 
In addition to these more developed carbon markets, proposed 
and early-phase ETSs in Thailand, Vietnam and Indonesia could be 
potential partners in Asia. For example, since 2014 Thailand has run a 
voluntary ETS limited to energy generation and petrochemical 
industry, developing MRV capacity in anticipation of future emissions 
trading across multiple sectors.153 Vietnam has also been working to 
develop MRV and institutional capacity to contemplate emissions 
trading in the steel sector and solid waste sectors.154 By the time China
expands the national ETS to include more domestic sectors, it could
form links with these other early-stage ETSs. However, these ETSs 
may be less of a priority as there is considerably more uncertainty 
compared to the slightly more developed markets in Japan and Korea. 
B. Challenges of Linkage in Asia 
There are significant challenges to linking carbon markets in Asia 
that range from technical issues of compatibility of the different 
systems to the political economy of linkage in a region that has not 
historically been inclined to cooperation.155 The proposition of 
cooperation on carbon markets and climate will need to garner
significant political momentum to be a real possibility in the future. 
Linkage with China’s ETS presents other governments with the 
questions of distributional justice and the co-benefits of emissions 
reductions. By pursuing linkage as a way to reduce the regulatory 
150. Sophie Yeo, The Legacy of the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, CARBON BRIEF (Mar. 10,
2016, 5:12 PM), https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-the-legacy-of-the-fukushima-nuclear-
disaster. 
151. Id. 
152. Arimura, supra note 147, at 104. 
153. Marissa Santikarn, Strong Competences for Emissions Trading in Thailand, ADELPHI, 
https://www.adelphi.de/en/project/strong-competences-emissions-trading-thailand (last visited
Nov. 15, 2019). 
154. P’SHIP FOR MKT. READINESS, PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION STATUS REPORT 4–7 (Apr. 
4, 2018), https://www.thepmr.org/system/files/documents/Vietnam_PMR%20Project%20 
Implementation%20Status%20Report_April%202018.pdf. 
155. For a more detailed discussion, see Suh-Yong Chung, Political Economy of Carbon 
Market Cooperation in Northeast Asia, in CARBON MARKET COOPERATION IN NORTHEAST
ASIA, supra note 84, at 72.
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burden on industry by importing permits from China, other 
jurisdictions forfeit domestic emissions reductions and the co-benefits
of those reductions. Furthermore, the trades that these linkages would 
cause a kind of transfer of wealth from those countries to China. In an 
environment in which developed countries have repeatedly called on 
China to have higher GHG mitigation ambition, these kinds of 
transfers could look like a subsidy of China’s climate policy.
Notwithstanding, transboundary air pollution from China to Japan and
Korea is an important issue in this region, and emissions reductions in
China could also translate into air quality and human health co-
benefits in both Japan and Korea.156 
Regardless of the jurisdiction(s) China chooses to link with, TPS 
will make those linkages more challenging. Firstly, most ETSs operate 
based on an absolute cap on GHG emissions. Some scholars have 
suggested that the rate-based emissions targets in China’s ETS 
preclude it from participating in Article 6.2 transfers.157 However, 
recent scholarship has suggested it is not impossible to link ETSs with 
different targets, such as China’s rate-based ETS with an absolute cap 
ETS, but it will be more complex than a linkage between cap-and-trade
systems.158 Mehling et al. suggest that China’s TPS allowances could be
translated into mass-based allowances for trading with an absolute cap 
ETS by utilizing the benchmark emissions-output ratio for that 
compliance period.159 The staggered allocation of TPS and associated 
delay of allowances into the market may be a barrier for future linkage
with other systems which have a single allocation period, but this study 
also suggests that banked allowances using the same translation to a
mass-based allowance could foster trades between ETS.160 Thus, while
it may be possible to facilitate linkage between China’s ETS and other 
systems with absolute caps on carbon, it will be more complicated and 
may have significant delays than under a scenario with less 
heterogeneous systems.
156. External Sources Account for 75 pct of S. Korea’s Fine Dust Pollution, YONHA NEWS
AGENCY (Feb. 6, 2019, 2:17 PM), https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20190206003300315. Granted,
this is a tenuous link, but other countries may benefit from significant improvements to air
pollution in China because of the extent of transboundary air pollution in the region.
157. Robert C. Stowe, The Paris Agreement’s Article 6 and Cooperation in Northeast Asia to
Address Climate Change, in CARBON MARKET COOPERATION IN NORTHEAST ASIA, supra note
84, at 41, 42–43. 
158.  Mehling et al., supra note 49, at 671.
 159. Id. at 673. 
160. Id. at 673, 683.
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V. CONCLUSION
Linkage of national ETSs is a desirable policy choice in the world 
of bottom-up emissions reduction measures, as it can reduce the global 
economic cost of climate mitigation. As China continues to develop its 
national ETS, it should consider design choices that make the market 
ready for links with other ETSs and continue its commitment to
cooperation to address climate change. Chinese policymakers should
prioritize investing into the institutions involved in setting ambition for 
the ETS, administering the allowances, inventory and trading, and
enforcing noncompliance during the single-sector phase of the ETS. 
The lessons learned at this stage will be critical for the development of 
institutional capacity and success of the program in later phases. 
Accounting standards for the firms will also be a critical piece of the 
puzzle, not only to ensure effective administration at the national level,
but to garner trust from the international community. These principles 
will also bring the ETS closer to linkage-readiness, as robust 
accounting and strong institutions are necessary prerequisites to ETS 
linkage and required by Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement.
